This paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model of North-South trade with carbon emissions to explore the strategic, open-economy implications of price and quantity based instruments for CO2 emission reduction. We compute non-cooperative environmental and trade policy equilibria and Nash bargaining outcomes in environmental policies with side payments of cash. Results show that quotas can lead to higher internalization levels in a non-cooperative zerotariff equilibrium in comparison with emission fees. If tariffs are also chosen non-cooperatively, the form of policy instrument used affects equilibrium tariffs, with quotas leading to lower trade barriers, particularly under a regional carbon treaty. 
Non-Technical Summary:
The choice of the most appropriate policy instrument to address environmental problems has been extensively debated by economists. Two broad approaches are usually distinguished: the incentive-based or price approach -which comprises policy instruments such as abatement subsidies and effluent charges -and the command-and-control or quantity approach -which comprises instruments such as processing standards and emission quotas and permits. Traditionally, this debate has focused on a closed-economy framework, where it has been argued that on economic efficiency grounds price instruments are superior to quantity instruments. Once the presence of trade flows and the possible use of trade-restricting policies are considered, however, the traditional ranking of environmental policy instruments may be altered. This paper uses an applied general equilibrium model to compare the performance of different environmental policy instruments for CO2 emission reductions in an open-economy framework where countries might use trade restrictions as well as environmental restrictions in a strategic way. Countries are grouped in two blocs: OECD and non-OECD members. They can establish agreements on CO2 emission reduction either within a single bloc or -provided that each bloc has agreed a common position -between blocs. We also take account of the developed countries' higher valuation of CO2 emission reduction and the special nature of these emissionthey deteriorate not only the environment of the emitting country but the global environment as well -a characteristic which gives rise to international free-riding in emission abatement. These features result in a higher degree of internalisation in the OECD bloc, and a strong tendency by non-OECD countries to free-ride. Consequently, an inter-bloc carbon treaty guaranteeing full internalisation of environmental emissions is mostly beneficial to OECD countries, and would only appeal to the South unless the North gives them some form of compensation in exchange.
Using this model, we find that if countries are unable to establish an agreement on emission reductions -either at a regional or inter-regional level -and can use trade-restrictive policies, each instrument's degree of correction (internalisation) of the environmental problem is very small, particularly for non-OECD members. When an intra-bloc agreement is implemented and countries are still able to use trade policy instruments, the degree of internalisation increases substantially, especially in the OECD bloc. In this scenario, the performance difference between emission quotas and taxes, in terms of their effects on global economic welfare is now significant and favourable to the former. The reason for this is that emission quotas lead to significantly lower levels of import tariffs, because they make export supply responses to changes in world commodity prices less elastic, and hence result in a less aggressive trade policy stance.
Introduction
This paper develops a calibrated model of North-South trade with carbon emissions to compare the implications of di erent domestic instruments for achieving CO2 emissions reductions in a strategic setting where economies are linked by trade ows.
The question of whether or not di erent instruments of environmental protection are equivalent has long occupied a central role in environmental economics. The literature usually distinguishes two broad approaches to address environmental problems: the incentive-based or price approach and the command-and-control or quantity approach. Associated with each there is a whole range of policy instruments such as subsidies, emission taxes and e uent c harges, on the one hand, and standards, quotas and emission permits, on the other see, e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1975 . In a non-strategic, non-stochastic, full-information environment, incentive-based and command-and-control instruments are in principle equivalent W eitzman, 1974; Adar and Gri n, 1976; Spulber, 1985 , although di erences may exist between the two i n terms of ease of administration. 1 Once uncertainty i s i n troduced, however, there is generally no longer an equivalence between fee-based and quantity-based instruments Fishelson, 1976; Weitzman, 1974 . If marginal valuation and marginal abatement cost schedules are not observable, incentive-based instruments can be more e cient in that they can achieve a given standard at a lower social cost Baumol and Oates, 1971; Baumol, 1972; Schultze, 1977 . On the other hand, in situations where rms have a high degree of market power, or where the need to act is particularly urgent, command-and-control instruments can be more e ective Baumol and Oates, 1975. 1 It has been argued that incentive-based instruments may be in some cases easier to administer Baumol and Oates, 1975 . In other cases, however, certain quantity-based instruments, notably tradeable emission permits, may h a ve practical advantages over their incentive-based counterparts, o ering greater control over the level of emissions both in a static and in a dynamic framework Oates, 1994. 1 In spite of these considerations, policy makers|especially in North America|have shown a preference for command-and-control instruments in implementing environmental standards Oates, 1986 . Some literature has been devoted to explaining this preference from a political economy perspective see, e.g., Buchanan, 1975; Mestelman, 1989 .
Another reason why quantity and price based instruments may be non-equivalent is their di erential impact on strategic trade policy interaction in an open economy framework: the responsiveness of supply decisions to trade policy changes is a ected by the presence of environmental policies, and this e ect is not the same for quantity and price based instruments. This may result in di erent non-cooperative trade policy outcomes, and, if environmental policies are used as substitutes for trade policies, in di erent levels of internalization. The non-equivalence between quantity and price based instruments in strategic contexts has been extensively analyzed both in the industrial organization literature|which has contrasted price and quantity setting behaviour e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984|as well as in the international trade literature|which has compared the implications of import tari s and import quotas under trade policy retaliation e.g., Rodriguez, 1974|but not in the environmental literature.
In this paper we contrast the implications of quantity and fee-based instruments of environmental protection in a strategic, open-economy, North-South setting. For this purpose we use a calibrated model of world trade, benchmarked to 1990 data on trade, consumption and production. Into this we add global environmental externality e ects from greenhouse emissions. We compute both non-cooperative Nash equilibria in trade and environmental policies when countries use tax or quota-based instruments, as well as Nash cooperative solutions where countries in both the North and the South regions jointly bargain over environmental policies in the presence of side payments of cash. Results of our numerical simulations allow us to compare noncooperative and cooperative equilibria for alternative e n vironmental policy regimes, and the associated North-South distribution of welfare gains and losses.
A recent paper which has introduced both international and strategic dimensions in environmental policy analysis is Copeland and Taylor 1995. In their model countries independently choose optimal emission quotas, which are implemented via tradeable permits. The authors use this setting to examine the impact of exogenous trade policy changes on environmental quality and welfare. Our analysis di ers from theirs in several respects. First, our focus is the comparison of quantity and pricebased environmental policy instruments. Second, we add a strategic dimension also to trade policy. Finally, w e also examine cooperative outcomes.
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There has been considerable discussion in recent y ears about the institution of policies to respond to global climate change, a discussion frequently characterized by a strong North-South connotation. This re ects developed and developing countries' di erent views and priorities over global environmental management. Industrialized countries have argued that, because of the global nature of greenhouse emissions, both developed and developing countries should be expected to clean up, and that failure by developing countries to comply should be penalized through the imposition of trade restrictions.
eration of the apparent U-shaped" relationship between environmental quality and per capita income Grossman, 1995. 4 The developing countries' position is thus that they should be either exempted from taking part in any substantive i n ternational environmental agreement or nancially compensated see Uimonen and Whalley, 1997; Whalley, 1997. 5 Although developed countries have shown some openness towards the idea of compensation, given the signi cance of the resource transfer involved see Uimonen and Whalley, 1997 , the compensation approach has eventually been rejected in favour of an exclusion" approach in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
Even if these developments seem to point to an abandonment of the idea of formally sanctioning the use of trade measures as an enforcement mechanism, interaction between countries in trade policies still remains, implying that the e ects of any e n vironmental policy cooperation arrangement should be evaluated against the backdrop of strategic trade policy interaction. The debate on the North-South dimensions of global environmental issues usually abstract from which form of instruments should be used to achieve a given emission reduction target; but, as we h a ve pointed out above, in a strategic open-economy setting the choice of instrument can a ect non-cooperative trade policy outcomes, and hence the size and the international distribution of the gains from internalization. And since trade retaliation represents the threat point" for bargaining, distributional outcomes under trade cooperation could also be a ected.
Indeed, results of our numerical simulations show that, under free trade, di er-ent instruments of CO2 emissions reduction are not equivalent; speci cally, emission quotas or equivalently country-speci c permits can lead to higher levels of internalization in a non-cooperative equilibrium than emission taxes do. The di erence, however, is not very pronounced, which is simply a symptom of the weak linkage between carbon emissions and tradeables production as evidenced by production and trade data. We also nd that if tari s are endogenized, countries cease to use environmental policy instruments as substitutes for trade polices, but the choice of domestic environmental instruments does nevertheless a ect non-cooperative tari s levels, with carbon quotas leading to lower trade barriers than emission charges do. With reference to negotiated outcomes, when tari s are endogenous and negotiations are restricted to environmental policies only, large trade barriers still remain. In this case, we also nd that emission quotas lead to lower non-cooperative tari s; and in a global environmental treaty with side payments of cash, the bargaining outcome is considerably more favourable to the South region if the treaty is supported by emission taxes rather than by emission quotas. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents a brief discussion of the implications of trade-environment linkages for noncooperative and cooperative policy responses. Section 4 describes the data used for parameter calibration. Section 5 presents our numerical simulations and analyzes results. Section 6 summarizes our ndings and concludes.
A T w o-Region Model of North-South Trade with Carbon Emissions
We assume two regions in the model, A and B, each respectively including N A and N B identical countries; we take region A as representing the North and region B the South. This North-South categorization is meant to re ect broad di erences in technologies and preferences, while at the same time maintaining the dimensionality of the model at a minimum.
There are two goods produced in each region, a tradeable good X, a non-tradeable good Y , and two factors, value added V , and energy, E. Consumers in each country view the tradeables produced domestically and abroad as imperfect substitutes, and consume both domestic and imported varieties, together with non-tradeables and environmental quality. The latter is a ected by the global emissions associated with the use of energy in production.
Preferences for In the rest of our model description in this section we shall restrict our attention to emission charges, and later discuss the modelling of quantity based instruments. Value added and energy are both used as inputs in the production of tradeables and non-tradeables, through constant-returns-to-scale technologies. Thus, domestic prices of domestically produced goods are equal to unit costs: The reason for using expanded income to derive consumer demand is that we model damage as a reduction in environmental quality, i.e. a good rather than as an economic bad." To illustrate by reference to a di erent context, this is analogous to modelling labour supply by h a ving leisure the di erence between time endowments and labour supply entering as an argument a good of the utility function, instead of having labour supply entering directly as a bad. If we model labour supply in this way, then leisure also needs to be included in expanded income to derive consumer choices. The two speci cations are fully equivalent.
25 Governments in each country are assumed to choose policies so as to maximize the utility of the representative consumers in their respective countries, given the policies chosen by other countries, the general equilibrium condition described above, and the constraints on policy choices implied by a n y i n ternational coordination agreements that may apply. A non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is then a con guration of policies such that the policy chosen by each country is a best response to the policies chosen by all other countries.
In the numerical implementation of the model, functional forms are speci ed as follows. Unit cost functions for tradeables and non-tradeables production are a Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution CES aggregation of energy and non-energy input prices: where is the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, and the s are energy share parameters. The above speci cation exploits symmetry across countries within regions to represent a situation where all countries within a region adopt identical trade and environmental policies. In our calculation of non-cooperative equilibria, however, we need to examine unilateral deviations in policy by individual countries in a region. For this purpose we need to distinguish a representative country in each region and distinguish its tari and tax rates, output levels and prices form those of other countries belonging to the same bloc.
Strategic Implications of Trade-Environment Linkages
In what follows, we discuss some possible implications of trade-environment policy linkages|drawing on earlier literature and using the analytical structure we h a ve just described as our frame of reference|to contrast e ects of fee and quota-based instruments for non-cooperative policy outcomes.
A central proposition in the theoretical trade and environment literature is that, if tradeables production and environmental emissions are linked, countries would tend to use environmental policies as second-best substitutes for trade policies in order to manipulate terms of trade in their favour Bhagwati, 1971; Markusen, 1975; Ludema and Wooton, 1994 . Countries which are net importers of pollution intensive goods will have an incentive to under-internalize the externalities to simulate an import tari , whereas exporters of pollution intensive goods will have an incentive t o o verinternalize to simulate an export tax. This e ect is also present in our setting, with the strength of the linkage between emissions and trade depending on how concentrated emissions are in the exporting sector, as well as on abatement possibilities in that sector and on the level of domestic consumption for the exported good. If emissions only originate in the exporting sector and if there are no direct abatement possibilities apart from reducing output, and if all the production of the sector is exported, then an emission tax will be fully equivalent to an export tax, and will thus represent a rst-best instrument from the point of view of a large exporting country for a ecting its terms of trade. If the exported good is also domestically consumed, then an emission tax will be equivalent to a production tax on the exporting sector, and its e ectiveness as a commercial policy instrument will be accordingly reduced. Furthermore, if emissions are not limited to the exporting sector, or if there exist signi cant abatement possibilities within sectors, then the trade policy-environmental policy linkage is signi cantly weakened, and there is less scope for using environmental policies as a substitute for trade polices.
How this policy linkage a ects welfare depends on its very strength. In the pres-ence of a global externality, such as global warming, free-riding by individual countries would in itself leads to under-internalization. If trade-environmental policy linkages are not too strong, then the use of environmental policies as second-best trade policy instruments can help sustain higher rates of internalization. If, however, the linkage is strong, it could lead to the externality being overcorrected|a point also noted by Ludema and Wooton.
To the extent that environmental policies can be used as substitutes for trade policies in an open economy setting, emission charges and emission quotas or permits will have di erent implications for non-cooperative outcomes|much as tari s and quotas do Rodriguez, 1974|owing to the di erent w ay in which they a ect individual countries' optimal responses. On theoretical grounds, there would be a presumption that an emission quota would lead to higher a level of internalization than a taxbased instrument; this is because the imposition of an emission limit in a country makes its import demand for emission-intensive goods more inelastic in comparison with an emission charge. Under an emission tax, a rise in the price of imports can lead to substitution towards domestic production, whereas under an emission limit such substitution is not possible. Consequently, the optimal export tax|which, as discussed earlier, is implicit in the use of environmental instruments|is higher under an emission target than under an emission tax; accordingly, i n ternalization levels in a non-cooperative equilibrium will be higher under a quantity based instrument.
Whether this di erence between the e ects of quantity and tax-based instrument in a strategic setting will lead to a more or less e cient non-cooperative outcome, again depends on the strength of the linkage discussed above. If this linkage is suciently strong and non-cooperative equilibria feature over-internalization, then emission targets will be worse, on e ciency grounds, than emission taxes; but in an under-internalization regime, emission quotas will be superior to a tax.
When direct trade policy instruments such as tari s are available to trading partners, environmental policies will cease to be the tool of choice for achieving trade policy objectives, which implies that non-cooperative rates of internalization will be lower. Nevertheless, the presence of emission taxes or quotas will a ect the tari retaliation outcome; and, since taxes and quotas a ect trade responses di erently, they will have di erent impacts on non-cooperative tari levels. Even when countries cooperate in environmental policies, emission taxes and quotas can still have di erent e ects on trade retaliation. If environmental emissions are closely linked to output levels, environmental cooperation supported by emission targets will tend to dampen producer supply responses; in turn, this will narrow the scope for an aggressive trade policy stance, leading to lower non-cooperative tari s. This dampening e ect, however, would not be present under emission taxation.
Asymmetries in economic size across countries imply asymmetries in strategic incentives across policy dimensions: large countries tend to win the trade policy game|because of their greater market power|and to lose the environmental policy game|since small countries can more easily free ride on them. This asymmetry in incentives, in turn, will translate into di erential e ects for large and small countries following a shift from price to quantity based instruments. Speci cally, since emission quotas tend to constrain trade retaliation, they will be relatively more favourable to small countries than to large ones.
In the next two sections, we shall explore these di erences between fee and quota based instruments, and their underlying mechanisms, by means of numerical simulations using a calibrated version of the model described in Section 2.
Data and Parameters
This section brie y describes the data used to parameterize the model. Parameterization for the trade side is straightforward, but the same cannot be said about the environment side of the model, due to the lack of suitable data, especially for parameters having to do with environmental quality and damage.
The production and trade data used for the trade submodel|as well as the data on population and number of countries per region|comes from the World Bank's World Development Report 1992 . T o parameterize our two-sector, two-region model structure, we take the non-traded sector as corresponding to construction and services, and the North as coinciding with OECD countries, with the rest of the world representing the South. Intra-regional and inter-regional trade ows have been obtained from UNCTAD 1992. All trade and production data we use are for the year 1990. As for trade elasticities, we h a ve taken the values used in Perroni and Wigle 1994 . Finally, the value we use for the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs is consistent with estimates which h a ve traditionally been used in the applied trade literature see, for instance, Perroni and Wigle, 1994; or Wigle and Whalley, 1991 . The basic data for this part of the model is presented in Table 1 .
Parameters for the environmental submodel Table 2 have been obtained as follows. Sectoral emission coe cients are based on input-output data on energy consumption and carbon dioxide CO2 emissions. The input-output data comes from the OECD 1995, and is based on the 1990 tables of Germany, United Kingdom and USA. The CO2 emissions data, in turn, was obtained from the OECD 1996. Inputoutput data has been used to compute energy consumption coe cients by sector. We have then applied their ratio to total CO2 emissions by OECD members to obtain emissions by sectors. These are then converted to the model units by m ultiplying them by the overall coe cient of energy consumption. In order to adjust for the fact that energy consumption in LDCs is often heavily subsidized, we h a ve used the OECD energy coe cient ratio to compute sectoral emissions for non-OECD countries.
Marginal valuations for environmental quality are derived using a revealed preference" argument. From Perroni and Rutherford 1993 we can obtain an estimate of the required unit carbon tax rate which w ould be needed to implement current proposals on CO2 emissions cuts. Assuming these proposals are indicative o f a n o ptimal policy, w e can combine this information with that of total carbon emissions and production income to compute the tax that would fully internalize the global externality associated with CO2 emissions. To obtain the marginal valuation for each bloc, we h a ve assumed that it is proportional to per capita income, which implies an elasticity of unity with respect to this variable. The hypothesis that marginal valuation of environmental quality increases with per capita income has found some empirical support either directly see Cicchetti and Smith, 1973; Desvouges et al., 1987 or indirectly see Grossman, 1995. In a survey about the willingness to pay WTP for recreation in the Spanish Peaks Primitive Area in Montana, USA, Cicchetti and Smith 1973 nd that the revealed WTP by its users rises by about 0.013 per extra unit of household income. On the basis of this estimate, and of some others reported in the same study, w e select a value of unity for the elasticity of marginal valuation with respect to income. This is consistent with evidence for a fairly broad range of household income level for an income level of $1,000 the elasticity w ould be 1.019, while from an income level of $80,000 it would be 1.0002.
Finally, the value for the elasticity of damage with respect to emissions that we use is based on Perroni and Wigle 1994. This elasticity v alue, together with the marginal valuation, enables us to infer values for the share of environmental quality in demand and for the implied endowment of global environmental quality.
Simulations and Results
The parameterized model is used to numerically simulate non-cooperative and cooperative policy outcomes. To compute non-cooperative equilibria, we iterate over calculations of optimal policy responses by representative countries in both region, subject to a full set of general equilibrium constraints as set out above until convergence to a Nash equilibrium is achieved. For this purpose, we model alternative environmental policy instruments as follows. When emission charges are used, we compute optimal responses by a country assuming that the emission charges in other countries are maintained at a constant level. When computing optimal responses under emission quotas, emission levels in other countries are held constant, and taxes are allowed to adjust endogenously so as to meet the given target.
We also compute cooperative bargaining solutions associated with these games in the presence of side payments of cash, adopting Nash's 1953 axiomatic solution concept. In computing bargaining solutions, we take the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution utilities as representing the disagreement point, simulate the utilities possibilities frontier under cooperation, and apply the Nash criterion to the product of the di erences in region utilities along the frontier and disagreement utilities.
Ten di erent scenarios are examined, both under an emission fee and an emission quotas regime:
1. No cooperation with free trade: obtained by iterative computation of optimal responses by individual countries in environmental policies under free trade until convergence to a non-cooperative equilibrium is reached;
2. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies with free trade: as for Scenario 1 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies by all countries in each region optimal responses are computed by maximizing joint w elfare for all countries in a region;
3. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies in the North with free trade: as for Scenario 2 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies only in the North region;
4. Global cooperation in environmental policies with free trade: all countries in each region adopt full-internalization emission taxes or quotas; 5. Nash bargaining over environmental policies with free trade and side payments of cash;
6. No cooperation with endogenous tari s: obtained by iterative computation of optimal responses by individual countries in trade and environmental policies until convergence to a non-cooperative equilibrium is reached;
7. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies: as for Scenario 7 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies by all countries in each region;
8. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies in North region only: as for Scenario 8 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies limited to the North region;
9. Global cooperation in environmental policies with endogenous tari s: all countries adopt full-internalization emission taxes or quotas; 10. Nash bargaining over environmental policies with side payments of cash. Simulation results are summarized in Tables 3 to 6. Tables 3 and 4 show results when tari s are frozen at zero free trade under emission taxes and quotas respectively. The non-cooperative outcome features under-internalization, suggesting a w eak direct linkage between carbon emissions and tradeables production. Also, note that in the trade data intra-bloc trade ows dominate inter-bloc ows in terms of their size, which, since countries are treated symmetrically within blocs, limits the e ects of asymmetries in incentives for net importers and net exporters of pollution intensive goods. If the linkage between emissions and tradeables production were su ciently strong, and inter-bloc trade su ciently large, the non-cooperative equilibrium could feature over-internalization. Indeed, we h a ve performed experiments with our model not shown which con rm the possibility of such an occurrence; for example, over-internalization occurs in the North region, when environmental policies are coordinated within regions, if we assume that emissions are only generated in the tradeables sector, and if we increase the share of tradeables production which is exported in the North by one-half and by a factor four in the South. As expected, internalization rates are higher under a quota regime, implying that quotas are superior on e ciency grounds. The di erence in internalization rates, however, is only signi cant when policies are coordinated within regions second and third columns of Tables 3 and 4 , and even in this case it is not large enough to generate a signi cant di erence between the two instruments in terms of welfare. Again, this is a re ection of the weak linkages between trade and carbon emissions.
If tari s are endogenous Tables 5 and 6 , non-cooperative equilibria feature lower internalization rates than under free trade, regardless both of the policy instrument used and of country size. This is because, when direct instruments of trade policy are available, countries no longer need to use environmental policies as substitutes for trade policies. In this case fee and quota based instruments are equivalent when responses are fully uncoordinated Scenario 6. But when environmental policies are coordinated within regions, a quota regime leads to signi cantly lower levels of non-cooperative tari s, and is clearly superior to an emission charge in terms of welfare. Indeed, Tables 5 and 6 show that, for any form of environmental cooperation regional or global, the tari rates associated with a quota regime are lower than those implied by an emission tax. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the fact that, when countries must abide by agreed upon environmental policies, quotas make export supply responses less elastic.
In contrast, emission charges raise producer prices, making export supply responses more elastic with reference to a partial equilibrium diagram, this e ect can be thought o f a s a n u p ward shift" of supply curves; in turn, higher elasticities result in increased trade barrier. This e ect is particularly dramatic under global environmental cooperation fourth and fth columns of Table 5 , where non-cooperative tari s in the South region are in excess of 100.
Whatever the regime, internalization rates are consistently higher in the North, re ecting its higher valuation for environmental quality; the tendency to free ride is stronger for the South. Intra-bloc environmental cooperation signi cantly raises internalization rates and welfare, especially in the North. With endogenous tari s, on the other hand, the North bloc experiences higher welfare losses than the South under non-cooperation, a nding that is in line with the fact that OECD countries trade more, especially among themselves.
Scenarios 3 and 8 correspond to a Kyoto Protocol"-type arrangement, with commitments to reduce emissions only undertaken by developed economies. Even when environmental policy cooperation is limited to the North region, if countries do not cooperate in trade policies, there is still a signi cant di erence between taxes and quotas, with both regions being better o if regional environmental cooperation is supported by quotas rather than by emission taxes Tables 5 and 6, third column.
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Compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium, global environmental cooperation in the form of full internalization without side payments favours both regions but especially the North bloc Scenarios 4 and 9. Compared to the zero-tax zero-tari scenario, however, with endogenous tari s this type of environmental cooperation would still leave both regions worse o if an emission charge were used Table 5 , Scenario 9; switching to a quota regime would make the North bloc better o , but the South would still continue to lose Table 6, Scenario 9.
In both regimes|emission charges and emission quotas|to induce full internalization by the South, the North would have to compensate them. Scenario 10 examines a global cooperation agreements supported as a Nash bargaining outcome through side payments. This outcome is clearly more favourable to the South in comparison with the no-side payments case; but the bargaining outcome is considerably more favourable to the South region and less unfavourable to the North if the environmental treaty is supported by emission quotas rather than by emission taxes.
Our simulation results highlight the di culties associated with global environmental cooperation in the form of full internalization given the strong regional asymmetry in terms of valuation of environmental quality. Global cooperation is obviously superior to no cooperation at all. However, in comparison with intra-regional cooperation, global environmental cooperation would be attractive for the North but not for the South; and the side payments required to make it appealing to the South would make it unattractive to the North, independently of both the environmental policy instrument used and whether or not tari s are endogenously determined. A global negotiated outcome would be even less attractive to the North if side payments, rather than being based on bargaining, were based on a property rights principle, with revenues from taxes, or, equivalently, rents from tradeable permits, being distributed according to population: given our parameterization, the implied transfers from the North to the South would be about one third larger than under Nash bargaining. This seems to be consistent with the current de facto abandonment|under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol|of both the idea of the South adopting much more stringent e n vironmental policies and that of the North compensating them for it. Our results also suggest that, with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the North may h a ve settled for an option clearly inferior for them to both intra-regional and global cooperation but which would appear acceptable to the South's interests.
Our numerical ndings should be quali ed by stressing the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the parameter values used for calibration. Elasticity v alues, in particular, are a crucial determinant of the level of non-cooperative trade barriers; assuming lower and possibly more realistic trade elasticities would lead to considerably higher barriers and trade-related e ects. Also, given the large per-capita income spread between the North and the South regions, a small change in the assumed value of the income elasticity o f e n vironmental quality v aluation can lead to a dramatically di erent imputation of abatement bene ts across regions.
We h a ve explored the e ects of these and other parameters through sensitivity analysis not shown. Although assuming di erent parameter values a ects noncooperative policy levels, as well as the magnitude and distribution of welfare e ects, the qualitative pattern of the results remains the same, and underscores the same general theme: in a strategic, open-economy setting, emission quotas are preferable to emission taxes on e ciency grounds, as they lead to higher rates of internalization under free trade, or to lower trade barriers when trade policies are determined noncooperatively. Both regions, and particularly the South, could thus gain from a regime switch from carbon charges to carbon quotas or permits.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we h a ve used a calibrated model of North-South trade with carbon emissions to compare the implications of quantity and fee based environmental policy instruments in a strategic, open-economy setting. We h a ve computed both noncooperative Nash equilibria in trade and environmental policies as well as Nash cooperative solutions where countries bargain over environmental policies.
Results of our numerical simulations show that, under free trade, di erent instruments of CO2 emissions reduction are not equivalent; speci cally, under free trade, carbon quotas or permits can lead to higher levels of internalization in a noncooperative equilibrium in comparison with carbon taxes. The di erence, however, is not very pronounced, a symptom of the fact that the direct linkage between carbon emissions and tradeables production is rather weak. If tari s are endogenized, carbon quotas and carbon taxes lead to similar levels of internalization, but non-cooperative tari s are higher under a carbon tax regime. Thus, although in a full-information, closed-economy setting carbon taxes and quotas or permits may be viewed as being equivalent, when trade linkages and strategic trade responses are accounted for, emis-sion quotas could be preferable as a means of supporting regional or global carbon treaties both for the North and the South.
In light of these results, the endorsement of an emission permit regime by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol appears to be a good choice where trade cooperation is concerned, although the stipulation in it of international tradeability for permits will make this regime rather more similar to an emission tax regime. On the other hand, even though both the North and the South stand to gain from the Kyoto agreement relatively to a non-cooperative scenario, gains are likely to be substantially larger for the South, who can free ride almost completely on the North's improved environmental management. Yet, there still seems to be scope for further global gains to be had from expanded participation under the U.N. Framework Convention; but, whatever the terms of such an enlarged agreement, the use of quotas rather than taxes to support it should reduce incentives for an aggressive trade policy stance, thereby a ecting multilateral trade negotiation outcomes.
